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Abstract 
Humans possess a remarkable ability to discriminate structure from 
randomness in the environment. However, this ability appears to be systematically 
biased. This is nowhere more evident than in the Gambler’s Fallacy (GF) – the 
mistaken belief that observing an increasingly long sequence of ‘heads’ from an 
unbiased coin makes the occurrence of ‘tails’ on the next trial ever more likely. 
Although the GF appears to provide evidence of ‘cognitive bias’, a recent theoretical 
account (Hahn & Warren, 2009) has suggested the GF might be understandable if 
constraints on actual experience of random sources (such as attention and short 
term memory) are taken into account. Here we test this experiential account by 
exposing participants to 200 outcomes from a genuinely random (p=.5) Bernoulli 
process. All participants saw the same overall sequence; however, we manipulated 
experience across groups such that the sequence was divided into chunks of length 
100, 10 or 5. Both before and after the exposure, participants i) generated random 
sequences and ii) judged the randomness of presented sequences. In contrast to 
other accounts in the literature, the experiential account suggests that this 
manipulation will lead to systematic differences in post-exposure behaviour. Our 
data were strongly in line with this prediction and provide support for a general 
account of randomness perception in which biases are actually apt reflections of 
environmental statistics under experiential constraints. This suggests that deeper 
insight into human cognition may be gained if, instead of dismissing apparent biases 
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as failings, we assume humans are rational under constraints. 
Keywords: Gambler’s Fallacy; randomness; rationality; experience 
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Fundamental to the success of the human species is its ability to discern 
regularities and structure in the world. This allows humans to successfully predict, 
explain, and manipulate their environment. At the same time, human beings seem to 
exhibit limitations in discerning patterns that, on occasion systematically lead them 
astray. Chief among these are misperceptions of randomness such as the Gambler’s 
Fallacy (GF): the mistaken belief that observing an increasingly long sequence of 
‘heads’ from an unbiased coin makes the occurrence of ‘tails’ on the next trial ever 
more likely. Misperceptions like the GF are of interest because they are 
consequential, whether in casinos (Croson and Sundali 2005), racetracks (Terrell 
1998), lottery play (Clotfelter and Cook 1993), or, possibly most worryingly, in 
financial markets (Johnson, Tellis, and MacInnis 2005); see also Rabin (2002). 
However, the GF also holds theoretical interest far beyond these practical concerns. 
The mistaken beliefs about randomness embodied in the GF sit somewhat 
paradoxically with the general success of humans at discriminating (unrewarding) 
randomness from (potentially valuable) structure in their everyday environment. 
Consequently, as an error, the GF offers the potential for deep insight into the 
criteria and cognitive processes by which human beings make judgments about 
statistical structure – in the same way that visual illusions are informative for 
understanding perception (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1972). Accordingly, the GF 
has attracted a long history of research in psychology (for reviews see Bar-Hillel & 
Wagenaar 1991; Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland & Hastie, 2009; Hahn, 2011). 
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There is evidence that problem gamblers believe in the GF, for example from 
‘thinking aloud studies’ during gambling, and that this mistaken belief plays a causal 
role in their gambling behaviour (see e.g., Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, 
Dragonetti & Tsanos, 1997; Ladouceur et al., 2001; Toneatto & Ladouceur, 2003). 
Outside this group, however, the degree to which people endorse the GF is 
somewhat less clear. This is because – in experimental laboratory studies – 
participants’ endorsement of the GF has typically only been inferred. Evidence for 
belief in the GF is indirect: it has been inferred from participants’ behaviour in 
random sequence generation tasks. The standard measure on which attribution of 
the GF has rested is the alternation rate: the probability with which a person 
alternates between the two outcomes of a ‘fair’ coin toss when generating a 
‘random’ sequence has been taken to reflect belief in the GF. Whilst the (long-run) 
alternation rate of a fair coin is 0.5, many empirical studies have observed that 
participants tend to “over-alternate”, generating binary sequences with higher 
alternation rates (Wagenaar, 1972). This finding is reflected also in sequence 
judgment tasks: here participants typically perceive sequences with higher 
alternation rates to be ‘more random’ Falk and Konold (1997) (though the exact 
alternation rate regarded as random is affected by context, Matthews, 2013). Over-
alternation may be taken as evidence of an erroneous belief in the GF (or the ‘self-
correcting’ nature of random processes more generally) because it reflects a bias 
against ‘runs’ or ‘streaks’ of one outcome (e.g., a succession of ‘heads’). 
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This dependence on indirect measures has consequences not only for 
ascertaining belief in the GF but also for explanation of that belief. It is difficult to 
distinguish whether over-alternations are “accurate reflections of biased notions of 
randomness, or biased reflections of accurate notions of randomness, or both” (Bar-
Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991). This problem is made more acute by the fact that 
randomness itself is a theoretically vexed notion that holds many counter-intuitive 
surprises (on the many consequences of this for psychological research see e.g., 
Ayton, Hunt & Wright, 1989; Nickerson 2002). 
As testament to the counterintuitive nature of randomness consider the 
following example. The GF is the clearly erroneous belief that a sequence of ‘heads’ 
(H) such as HHH is more likely to be followed by ‘tails’ (T), than by another H, given 
an unbiased coin. However, as Hahn and Warren (2009) point out, if we start 
flipping an unbiased coin, we will (on average) have to wait less long to encounter 
HHHT than HHHH (Gardner, 1988; Guibas & Odlyzko, 1981, Figure 1A).  
More generally the so-called wait times for all 16 binary sequences of length 4 
are presented in Figure 1A. Note that there are significant differences between wait 
times across sequences. These differences in wait time may seem surprising to those 
encountering the concept for the first time. However, they are a mathematical fact 
and they have the immediate consequence that the respective probabilities of 
encountering the sequences HHHT and HHHH are equal only if flipping an unbiased 
coin exactly four times or infinitely many times. For values in between these two 
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extremes, probabilities will not be the same. Imagine flipping a coin, say, 20 times 
and checking whether either HHHH or HHHT arise at least once in that series. Given 
that the wait time for HHHH is longer than that for HHHT, HHHH will also be less 
likely to occur at all. The probability of not encountering the string HHHH within 
those 20 tosses of the coin is directly determined by the wait time (Figure 1B). This 
means that a person who bets $1 on the sequence HHHT occurring at least once in a 
sequence of 20 coin tosses will, on average, earn more than a person who makes the 
same bet for HHHH (see Hahn & Warren, 2009, 2010). This bet sounds incredibly 
similar to erroneous belief in the GF, yet it is mathematically sound, and it provides 
the basis for a possible explanation of seeming GF-like beliefs.  
Inspired by these counterintuitive mathematical results, Hahn & Warren 
(2009) suggested that constraints on attention and/or short-term memory (STM) 
may dictate that human experience of random events is actually akin to viewing 
‘local’ sub-sequences in a longer finite ‘global’ stream of events (see Figure 2). 
Specifically, people will necessarily only ever see finite sequences of outputs from 
random sources such as unbiased coins, and they will experience that sequence 
unfolding in time with a limited short term memory that can monitor only a fixed 
length sequence. Human experience of random events can therefore be thought of 
as a sliding window containing a local sequence of length k moving through a finite 
global sequence of length n> k. 
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The simple experiential model of Figure 2 necessarily results in differences 
between the number of occurrences of different local sub-sequences in a longer 
global sequence (as illustrated in Figure 1). Consequently it may explain seeming 
‘bias’: what appears biased if one is thinking simply about sub-sequences in 
isolation, can be seen as reflecting genuine environmental experience once the fact 
that sub-sequences arise within longer global streams is taken into account.1   
Focusing more specifically on the distribution of sub-sequences HHHH and 
HHHT, Figure 3 shows that these are very different in global sequences of moderate 
length. A person will most likely encounter zero occurrences of HHHH in a sequence 
of length 20. It is only for longer global sequences (Figure 3, panels e and f) that the 
frequency of HHHH will tend toward that of HHHT, that is, the two sequences will 
become alike only with greater experience of the generating source. At the root of all 
this is the difference in the shape of the underlying distributions for probability of 
occurrence. While the mean (i.e. the expected frequency) of each distribution is the 
same for all sub-sequences, the distributions vary hugely in their skew for global 
sequences of moderate length. This difference is attenuated only as the global 
sequence becomes longer (see Figure 3g). In addition the probabilities of non-
                                                        
1 Note that it is crucial to the model that the sliding window moves incrementally 
through the sequence (as is implied, for example, in tests of short term memory 
such as the N-back test, see e.g., Kane, Conway, Miura, & Colflesh, 2007). If the 
attentional/STM window were to ‘jump’ through the global sequences in non-
overlapping, sequential chunks (e.g., H H T H T H T T would be broken up into just H 
H T H and T H T T) then successive local sequences would be entirely independent 
and the expected values of their occurrence would be equal across all possible 
sequences just as they are when k = n.  
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occurrence for HHHH vs. HHHT become much closer to each other (and to zero) as 
the length of the global sequence increases. These factors, in turn, suggest that the 
way people experience sequences of outputs from random sources in everyday life, 
might explain seeming misperceptions of randomness2.  
The simple experiential model in Figure 2 and the associated mathematical 
consequences render the GF comprehensible in that it seems a rather subtle error 
once placed in the context of the very similar beliefs one could have that, in fact, are 
accurate, such as the winning bet on HHHT in global sequences of length 20 given 
above. In addition it is also worth pointing out that the GF is, of course, not a fallacy 
when sampling without replacement (i.e. repeatedly drawing a ball from an urn 
with equal numbers of red and blue balls and not replacing the ball after each draw). 
One explanation for belief in the GF that has been put forward in the literature is 
that the GF may be based on confusion between sampling with and without 
replacement (e.g., Ayton et al., 1989). On Hahn and Warren’s simple model of 
experience, however, sampling with and without replacement are surprisingly 
similar in experiential terms as shown in Figure 4. Comparing non-occurrence 
probabilities of sequences RRRR and RRRB (now representing red and blue balls 
                                                        
2 This discussion of differences in wait time and non-occurrence probability 
generalizes to other values of k and n for k<n<∞ (see Hahn & Warren, 2009). 
However, the choice of length 4 sub-sequences in Figures 1 & 2 is not accidental. It 
has been suggested that the effective storage capacity limit for short term memory 
is 4 ± 1 item (when performance strategies such as rehearsal which might differ 
between participants are prevented) (Cowan, 2001, 2010). 
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randomly drawn from an urn in which they are present in equal proportion) shows 
that the sequence probabilities are virtually unaffected by whether or not sampling 
is with or without replacement, or the number of balls in the urn initially. In other 
words, just from limited sequential experience it is almost impossible to distinguish 
between the two kinds of source. If such a confusion between sampling with and 
without replacement does indeed exist, the experiential model provides a 
straightforward explanation why: just from observing random sequences, the 
difference between the two seems extremely hard to learn.  
The Hahn & Warren (2009) account, then, shifts the dominant perspective in 
randomness perception away from cognitive bias and instead recasts phenomena 
like GF as unavoidable mathematical consequences of sensitivity to environmental 
statistics with a constrained window of experience. In this respect it differs 
fundamentally from previous accounts of the GF and, or, over-alternation (Baddeley, 
1966; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Kareev, 1992; Rapoport & Budescu, 1997, see 
discussion below). These have attributed the fallacy to biased beliefs that are at 
odds with statistics such as the ‘representativeness heuristic’ which mistakenly 
attributes to short sequences the properties of long sequences (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972; Rapoport & Budescu, 1997). Or they have attributed over-
alternations in sequence generation to resource constraints distorting an 
underlying, unbiased conception of randomness itself (e.g., Kareev, 1992). The 
present account takes up the idea of resource constraints, but asks how these 
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constraints shape people’s actual experience of random sequences. In so doing, it 
identifies ways in which seemingly biased beliefs about randomness are, in fact, 
correct and represent reflections of (experienced) environmental statistics.  
This, finally, also has implications for the assessment of explicit belief in the 
GF. Shorter sequences have alternation rates that lie above the long run average 
(see also Kareev, 1992). Consequently over-alternation may simply be a reflection of 
the statistics of random sequences as experienced. However, there is no reason why 
this should necessarily be coupled with explicit belief in the GF. Therefore, it is 
essential to probe whether or not people endorse the GF with other measures than 
just alternation rate; in particular it would seem appropriate to supplement indirect, 
implicit measures such as alternation rate, with direct, explicit probes concerning 
people’s beliefs. 
Taken together these considerations suggest that if the prevalence and causes 
of the GF are to be understood then there is a clear need for experimental studies 
that: i) probe the role of experience in the GF ii) test the experiential model of Hahn 
& Warren (2009); iii) consider the extent to which direct and indirect measures of 
belief in the GF are in agreement. We next outline an experimental paradigm to 
address these questions.  
 
An Experimental Test 
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Crucially under the Hahn & Warren (2009) account, not only should 
experience of the output of random sources be expected to modify perception of 
randomness but also global sequence length (parameter n in Figure 2) should 
matter. This critical role of global sequence length provides a basis for an empirical 
test of a general role for experience in the GF and of the specific experiential model 
of Hahn & Warren (2009), thereby addressing points i) and ii) above. 
To see the effect of global sequence length consider Figures 3a to f, showing 
distributions of occurrence frequencies of both HHHH and HHHT for three values of 
n (20, 50, 200). Note that for each global sequence length the mean number of 
occurrences of the two sub-sequences is the same, however, the frequency 
distributions are markedly different. It is precisely this difference in distributions 
that drives the difference in wait times and non-occurrence probabilities seen in 
Figure 1. The primary difference between HHHH and HHHT occurrence 
distributions is in the skew. Both distributions show positive skew at each global 
sequence length, however this is more pronounced in the case of HHHH. The 
increased skew for HHHH reflects that fact that although frequency is bounded 
below by 0 for both sub-sequences the spread in the HHHH distribution is greater. 
Consequently, for a global sequence of any given length it is more likely that there 
will be very few occurrences of HHHH than very few occurrences of HHHT. Figure 
3g summarises the relationship between skew and global sequence length and 
suggests that this tendency for differences between HHHH and HHHT distributions 
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decreases with global sequence length. In summary, Figure 3 suggests that exposure 
to longer global sequences should diminish discrepancies in the frequencies with 
which HHHH and HHHT are encountered.  
A manipulation of global sequence length could thus be at the heart of an 
experimental test of the experiential model: experience of longer global sequences 
should reduce differences in perceived randomness of HHHH and HHHT. Global 
sequence length, however, is also naturally correlated with the overall amount of 
experience: presenting one participant with a global sequence of length 20 and 
another participant with a sequence of length 200 also means the latter receives 10 
times as much experience of a random source. A better experimental manipulation 
would thus seek to manipulate global sequence length while keeping constant the 
overall amount of exposure to a random generating source.  
This can be achieved by providing several shorter global sequences so as to 
match the total amount of experience: a participant who sees 10 global sequences of 
length 20 will see the same number of coin tosses as one who sees 1 global sequence 
of length 200. Yet, as Fig. 3 shows, the distribution of HHHH and HHHT will be 
different under these two presentation conditions (e.g. compare figures 3a,b to 
figures 3e,f). 
For even greater experimental control, one can literally take the same total 
exposure as represented by a particular finite sequence of coin tosses and divide it 
up into global sequences of different length to generate differences across 
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sequences for the experiential model: Specifically, in a sequence of length 200 a 
person with a sliding window of length 4 could observe a maximum of 197 runs of 
HHHH. However, when that same sequence is divided into 20 global sequences of 
length 10, the maximum number of HHHH runs that can be observed is only 140. 
Figure 5 shows this relationship for the same total experience of 200 coin tosses 
discretized into ‘global sequence’ chunks of varying size. The way the same overall 
experience is divided up into ‘global sequences’ determines an upper bound on the 
number of runs a person could ever observe as the attentional window moves 
through these global sequences.  
These considerations provide a simple test based whereby the same total 
exposure is presented to participants in subtly different ways: Specifically, the same 
200 coin tosses might be presented as 2 global sequences of length 100 or, 
alternatively, as 10 smaller global sequences of length 20. The difference in 
experience for the observer is rather subtle – exactly the same set of outcomes is 
observed but in blocks of different lengths with gaps in between. However, under 
the Hahn & Warren (2009) account this should lead to different behaviour in a 
randomness perception task. Specifically, increasing the length of global sequences 
should lead to increased tendency to produce runs of identical outcomes (leading to 
reduced AR) in a generation task or to judge a run of identical outcomes as random 
in a judgment task. 
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Our study tests whether the subtle manipulation of global sequence length 
suggested above leads to changes in both the judgment and generation of random 
sequences. We presented the same length-200 sequence to all participants but 
manipulated whether they saw it in 40 chunks of length 5, 20 chunks of length 10 or 
2 chunks of length 100. Chunk size is therefore analogous to the global sequence 
length n in Figure 2, and we expect that exposure to different n will be reflected in 
the extent to which people produce data consistent with Gambler’s Fallacy 
measures. In a random sequence generation task we measured the alternation rate 
(AR) and the GF ratio (i.e. the ratio of HHHH to HHHT) for occurrences of sub-
sequences of length 4. 
Based on Figure 4 we expect that the commonly observed under-emphasis of 
runs (H . . . H) will diminish as chunk size increases and behaviour will become more 
in line with normative properties of binomial sequences. Accordingly, as chunk size 
increases, alternation rate should decrease, moving closer to the normative value of 
0.5, and the GF ratio should increase moving towards the normative value of 1. 
Furthermore, in a randomness judgment task we used Falk & Konold’s (1997) 
method to assess which AR was perceived as most random. We predict that as 
chunk size increases the AR judged as most random will again decrease and move 
closer to 0.5.  
In addition to focusing on the sequences HHHH and HHHT, which are 
particularly relevant for the GF, we also consider the other 14 local sub-sequences 
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of length 4, assessing whether Hahn & Warren (2009) predicts their prevalence in 
the generation task. Finally, to address point iii) above we assessed the relationship 
between explicit beliefs in the GF and the indirect measures (such as AR) commonly 
assumed to be equivalent to belief in the GF. To do this we developed a short 
questionnaire which probed participants directly on their explicit beliefs in GF. 
Methods 
Participants 
One hundred and eighteen people volunteered to take part from the University 
of Manchester student and staff population. Participants gave informed consent, and 
received course credit or £7.50 as reimbursement for their time. Participants’ mean 
age was 21, SD = 4.8, 77% of participants were female. There were no exclusion 
criteria. 
Materials 
Participants were seated in front of a 19” monitor at a 1280 x 1024 resolution. 
Participants made responses using a standard Windows keyboard. 
Design 
Within subjects, participants generated and judged a sequence both before and 
after being exposed to sequences generated by a .5 Bernoulli process. Between 
subjects we manipulated the nature of the exposure by chunking it into different 
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sized blocks. There were three levels of this chunk size IV (100,10,5). Overall this 
resulted in a two within (exposure: pre,post) x three between (chunk size: 100,10,5) 
design. Forty participants were in the 20 x 10 condition, 39 in the 2 x 100 and 39 in 
the 40 x 5 condition. All participants were presented with the same 200 coin tosses 
in succession. This series was generated by a Bernoulli process, but was checked to 
ensure that it had a representative alternation rate of approximately . 5. The nature 
of the exposure differed only in terms of the size of chunk the series was divided 
into, 2 x 100, 20 x 10 or 40 x 5. The gap between chunks was very short, typically 
around one second. Chunking in this manner gave rise to global sequences (see 
Figure 5) of varying length 𝑛 while still controlling for the overall amount and 
content of experience. 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of both generation and judgment of random 
sequences. These were repeated before and after an observation phase in which 
participants saw output from a genuine random source. At the end of the 
experiment participants completed a questionnaire designed to elicit their beliefs 
about the gambler’s fallacy. This included asking people how they would bet after a 
sequence of five heads in a row, and whether after five heads: heads was most likely, 
tails was most likely, or both were equally likely. 
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Generation task. Participants were asked to generate a series of coin tosses 
by pressing 1 for heads and 0 for tails on the computer keyboard. They were 
instructed to produce a sequence that they thought would be representative of 
flipping a fair coin. Participants were encouraged to type at a speed of roughly 1 
press per second, and they could see an ‘H’ or ‘T’ appear on the screen. Each display 
of H or T replaced the previous display so participants could not see the history of 
their sequence. Participants were instructed to generate a sequence of length 200 in 
2 blocks of 100. In between each block the screen would display the message 
‘sequence 2 of 2:’ and required the participant to acknowledge it by pressing ‘c’ to 
continue. 
Judgment. The judgment task was adapted from Falk & Konold (1997). Ten 
sequences of heads and tails were used. Each sequence was of length 21 but varied 
in alternation rate from 0.1 to 1. The participants’ task was to rate each sequence 
according to how likely it was to have been produced by a fair coin. Participants 
were required to start by giving scores of 0 and 10 to the least and most likely 
sequences respectively. They were then free to score the other sequences relative to 
these and they could use the same score more than once. The pre and post-
observation judgment tasks used the same alternation rates but different sequences. 
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Observation. Participants were told: “Some people find it difficult to generate 
random sequences. You are now going to see a genuine random sequence that 
would be produced by a fair coin. You should pay attention to the sequence, and 
then you will be asked to generate a new sequence” An ‘H’ or ‘T’ was presented with 
a SOA of 700 msec. Each presentation replaced the previous one so that the history 
of the sequence was not visible. All participants experienced the same sequence 
except that in different conditions the number of breaks changed (1,19 or 39). A 
break consisted simply of the participant pressing the letter ‘c’ on the keyboard to 
continue, this typically took around one second. 
Analyses 
For all analyses we compare the sequences that participants generated before 
and after they were exposed to the genuine random sequence.  In this way we can 
test the impact of the exposure on the different metrics associated with generation 
and judgment of random sequences. 
We also gave participants a questionnaire designed to probe their beliefs 
around the GF. We classify participants who stated that a tails is more likely after a 
run of heads as ‘believers’ in the GF.  We compare the metrics or alternation rate 
and the ratio HHHH:HHHT between the believers and non-believers. For these 
analyses we use the pre-exposure data of our participants. 
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Results 
Generation 
Participants’ raw data consisted of the self-generated sequences of length 200, 
produced in two blocks of 100. For each participant, we measured their Alternation 
Rate (AR) over the entire 200 bit sequence, that is, we calculated the number of 
switches between H and T as a proportion of a maximum 198. Analysis of the 
alternation rate in generated sequences before exposure showed that participants 
typically over-alternated at around 0.6, consistent with the literature (reviewed in 
Falk and Konold, 1997). Figure 6a shows the change in alternation rate from the 
pre-exposure to post-exposure generation. In line with our predictions, the 
alternation rate decreased most in the 2x100 condition and least in the 40x5 
condition. A Mixed ANOVA3 revealed a significant effect of exposure (pre,post) 
𝐹(1,115) = 18.51, 𝑝 < .001, η2G = .06, and a significant interaction (exposure x 
chunk size) 𝐹(2,115) = 3.72, 𝑝 = .027, η2G = .03. There was a non-significant main 
effect of chunk size 𝐹(2,115) = .59, 𝑝 = .56. Bonferroni corrected t-tests (alpha = 
.016) for each of the three conditions revealed that the effect of exposure was 
significant in the 2 x 100 (𝑝 < .01) and 20 x 10 (𝑝 = .01) conditions, but not in the 
40 x 5 condition (𝑝 = .63). 
                                                        
3 We report generalised eta squared as the measure of effect size (Olejnik & Algina 2003; Bakeman, 
2005) 
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Using the same data we also checked for a different measure indicative of the 
GF: we measured the ratio of sequences containing a run of length 4 to those 
containing a run of length 3 with an alternation i.e., HHHH:HHHT and TTTT:TTTH. 
This analysis revealed that pre-exposure participants typically produced twice as 
many HHHT sequences. Figure 6b shows the ratios pre-exposure and post-exposure 
(three participants were excluded from this analysis as a ratio could not be 
calculated due to never generating long-enough runs). In line with our predictions, 
in the 2 x 100 condition the ratio increased by 0.35 to 0.77, while in the 40 x 5 
condition the ratio increased by just .05 to 0.45. A Mixed ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of exposure (pre,post) 𝐹(1,112) = 20.27, 𝑝 < .001 η2G = .07, and a 
significant interaction (exposure x chunk size) 𝐹(2,112) = 3.78, 𝑝 = .026, η2G = .03. 
There was a non-significant main effect of chunk size 𝐹(2,112) = 2.91, 𝑝 = .058. 
Bonferroni corrected t-tests (alpha = .016) for each of the three conditions revealed 
that the effect of exposure was significant in the 2 x 100 (𝑝 < .01) and 20 x 10 
(𝑝 = .01) conditions, but not in the 40 x 5 condition (𝑝 = .51). 
Figure 7 shows the effect of exposure on participants’ production of runs of 
length three and five. In both cases the pattern is the same as for runs of length four. 
For the analysis at length five there is a loss of power since participants rarely 
produced runs of this length. Figure 8 shows that the maximum number of 
occurrences of runs decreases as a sequence of length 200 is discretized into smaller 
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chunks. The same pattern is observed for different lengths of run, but is more 
pronounced for longer runs. 
Judgment 
Participants’ raw data were relative rankings of how likely they perceived each 
of the 10 test sequences to have been produced by a fair coin. When AR is plotted 
against the judged randomness the data follows an inverted ‘U’ shape Falk and 
Konold (1997) since sequences with either high or low ARs look non-random. For 
each participant we fit a quadratic function to their judgment data and recovered 
the peak of the fitted curve for their pre-exposure and post-exposure data. Thus for 
each participant we obtained the alternation rate they judged most random before 
and after exposure (i.e. the peak of the fitted quadratic). For the purpose of 
illustration, Figure 9 shows the aggregate level fits (i.e. over data from all observers) 
for randomness judgments in the 20x10 condition. 
Before any exposure people typically rated the 0.6 alternation sequence as the 
most likely to have been produced by a fair coin. This is consistent with other 
results in the literature (e.g., Falk & Konold, 1997; Zhao, Hahn & Osherson, 2014). 
Figure 6c shows how the fitted peak position changed from pre-exposure to post-
exposure in each condition (averaged over observers). The 2 x 100 and 20 x 10 
conditions exhibited similar shifts in judgment toward 0.5 as the AR most likely to 
have been produced by a fair coin. The 40 x 5 condition revealed a smaller shift. A 
Mixed ANOVA revealed a significant effect of exposure (pre, post) 𝐹(1,115) =
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32.38, 𝑝 < .001, η2G = .08, and a significant interaction (exposure x chunk size) 
𝐹(2,115) = 4.17, 𝑝 = .018, η2G = .02. There was a non-significant main effect of 
chunk size 𝐹(2,115) = .56, 𝑝 = .57. Bonferroni corrected t-tests (alpha = .016) for 
each of the three conditions revealed that the effect of exposure was significant in 
the 2 x 100 (𝑝 < .01) and 20 x 10 (𝑝 < .01) conditions, but not in the 40 x 5 
condition (𝑝 = .21). This matches the findings of the generation task.  
Explicit Gambler’s Fallacy Beliefs and Indirect Measures 
Participants were asked how they would bet on a fair coin following a 
sequence of five heads. Eighty per cent responded that they would bet tails. 
Participants were also asked which outcome was most likely following five heads. Of 
those that bet tails to the initial question, 75% answered that both outcomes were 
equally likely, while the remainder responded that tails was more likely. All 
participants were asked whether they found it counter-intuitive that a run of heads 
did not mean an increased probability of a tails on the next flip. Eighty seven per 
cent of participants indicated that they did find it counter-intuitive. 
We label the participants that stated a tails outcome was more likely after a 
run of heads as believers in the GF. We then probed potential differences between 
‘believers’ and ‘non-believers’, see Fig. 10. First, we sought to examine the link 
between participants’ explicitly stated beliefs and the implicit measures of 
alternation rate and the ratio HHHH:HHHT.  An examination of the alternation rate 
among believers and non-believers in their pre-exposure sequences shows that 
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there was no significant difference between the two groups. Likewise, an 
examination of the ratio HHHH:HHHT showed no difference between believers and 
non-believers. To support the conclusion that there was no difference between the 
groups on these measures we conducted a Bayes Factor t test (Rouder, Speckman, 
Sun, Morey, Iverson, 2009). For the alternation rate test of believers vs non-
believers: Bayes factor = 3.38, t = 0.77, p = 0.444 indicating that the null hypothesis 
(no difference) was around three and a half times more likely than the alternative 
hypothesis given the data. For the ratio HHHH:HHHT test of believers vs non-
believers: Bayes factor = 4.15, t = −0.35, p = 0.729 again supporting the conclusion 
that there was no difference between the groups. In short, individual differences 
with respect to alternation rate (see also Budescu, 1987) were unrelated to explicit 
beliefs about the GF. 
 
The Experiential Account and Rival Theories of Randomness Perception 
The results thus far indicate clearly that AR is unrelated to explicit GF belief. 
Furthermore it is modified by experience, and global sequence length moderates the 
impact of experience. The decoupling between explicit belief and AR suggests that 
AR is not a suitable measure for belief in the GF. Nevertheless, over-alternation 
remains a feature of human randomness perception that needs to be explained. The 
moderating influence of global sequence length is a unique prediction of the Hahn & 
Warren (2009) experiential model. Consequently, that result boosts the experiential 
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model over other, rival accounts. However, there are also other facets of the data 
that are relevant to adjudicating between rival theories, not just of the GF but of 
randomness perception more generally. We next highlight these aspects.  
The majority of past studies of human randomness perception have involved 
sequence generation tasks (e.g., Wagenaar, 1972; Kareev, 1992; Rapoport & 
Budescu, 1997; Nickerson. & Butler, 2009). A smaller number of studies has used 
sequence judgment tasks (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Even fewer are studies 
such as ours that have examined sequence generation and judgment together. This 
matters because empirically adequate accounts of randomness perception have to 
be able to explain both generation and judgment. Yet many theoretical treatments 
have focussed exclusively on one or the other.  
As outlined in the introduction, the key theoretical tensions between different 
accounts have centred on the contrast between “accurate reflections of biased 
notions of randomness, or biased reflections of accurate notions of randomness” 
(Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991). An example of the latter is Kareev’s (1992) account 
which attributes over-alternation in sequence generation tasks to STM limitations.4 
In effect, participants have an adequate notion of randomness, but over-alternations 
arise because they can plan only in relatively short sequences, and short sequences 
                                                        
4 Rapoport and Budescu (1997) provide an implementation of Kareev’s (1992) 
account with the difference that whereas Kareev assumes an unbiased underlying 
conception of randomness, Rapoport and Budescu’s model implements 
‘representativeness’ by modelling STM based output selection through sampling 
without replacement.  
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necessarily have alternation rates that lie above the long run average. As evidence 
for this, Kareev (1992) shows correlations between AR and measures of STM. 
Kareev’s insight on the link between sequence length and alternation rate is 
profound and, as seen above, figures also in the experiential model. However, 
Kareev’s use of the concept does not go far enough. There is nothing on Kareev’s 
account that would predict matching findings regarding alternation rate for both 
generation and judgment, given that a sequence presented for judgment can be 
scanned and rescanned at will, and does not require planning in the way that 
sequence generation does. Yet the data on alternation rate match closely across 
judgment and generation. 
To illustrate this point, we divided the generation data from our participants 
into sequences of length 20, so as to match the sequences seen in the judgment task. 
We then plotted the resultant data in histograms representing the number of length 
20 sequences generated with each alternation rate, shown in Fig. 11 below.  The 
shape and moments of the resultant distributions can be compared with the 
judgment data shown in Fig. 9 above, and reveal a close correspondence across 
judgment and generation.  
This correspondence argues against the notion that over-alternations simply 
reflect information processing limitations that are preventing people from 
expressing their true, underlying conception of randomness (cf. also Baddeley, 
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1966). Instead, it suggests that the underlying conception of randomness itself is 
influenced by STM in the way the experiential model assumes.  
It is only on the experiential account, furthermore, that the effect of exposure 
can be explained. There is no reason to assume that participants’ STM capacity is 
affected by the 200 bit total exposure to a random source which they receive in our 
experiments.  So an STM-based planning limitation necessarily leaves the shift in AR 
from pre- to post-exposure seen in our participants in both generation and 
judgment (Fig. 9 and Fig. 11) data entirely unexplained.  
 
Finally, Figures 9 and 11 are also informative with respect to another account 
of human randomness perception. Whereas most psychological theories have 
focussed on ‘randomness’ as defined by the nature of the underlying generating 
source, Falk and Konold’s (1997) account views randomness as a property of 
sequences themselves, in line with theoretical accounts of randomness based on 
algorithmic complexity (see Beltrami, 1999 for an introduction to the latter). From 
the perspective of algorithmic complexity, sequences are random to the extent that 
they are incompressible, that is, they cannot be given descriptions that are shorter 
than simply listing the sequence itself.  Short descriptions can capitalise on inherent 
structure; randomness –as the opposite of structure- does not admit of short 
descriptions because there are no regularities to summarise. Falk & Konold (1997) 
draw on such notions to suggest a psychological notion of randomness based on the 
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notion that the more ‘regular’ a sequence, the easier it is to encode either in verbal 
description or memory. Specifically, people use memorability of sequences as a 
proxy for randomness in their judgments of randomness. Following Falk and Konold 
(1997) Fig. 9 above plots alternation rate against approximate entropy, a sequence 
based measure of randomness. Falk & Konold (1997) concluded that the 2nd order 
approximate entropy (a measure of minimum description length, see Beltrami, 
1999) provided a reasonably good (although biased) description of their 
randomness judgment data. This entropy metric quantifies the average information 
contained in a bit, given knowledge of the preceding bit. Low and high entropy then 
reflect either compressible or incompressible sequences respectively. Visual 
inspection suggests a reasonable enough fit between the sequences and their 
approximate entropy in our data also (see solid grey line in Figure 9). Furthermore, 
the role of exposure would seem to be to bring judgments into greater alignment 
with approximate entropy, at least at first glance (although the effects of our global 
sequence length manipulation are, of course, left unexplained).   
To compare further the comparison between entropy and the experiential 
model, we examined the entropy of the length 4 sequences that make up the sliding 
window on the experiential account.  The entropy measure is, to some extent, 
correlated with the predictions of the Hahn and Warren experiential model, but 
there are noticeable differences. These are illustrated in Figure 12 which plots the 
differences between all possible sequences of length 4 in terms of their wait time 
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based differences (blue dashed line, representing theoretical occurrence rate for 
k=4, n=20; see also Fig. 1 a above) and their respective differences in terms of 
approximate entropy (black line). In particular, entropy makes fewer distinctions 
between the sequences than does wait time/occurrence rate. This suggests the 
possibility of a comparison between entropy (and thus Falk and Konold’s 
algorithmic complexity based account) and the experiential model.  
We used the 20-bit sequences of Fig. 11 and counted, across the set of 
sequences, the occurrence of each of the 16 possible sub-sequences of length 4 
within a sliding window moving through the global length 20 sequence.  Figure 13 
shows the correlations obtained (both pre and post exposure) between the 
observed occurrence rates and the theoretical predictions of the experiential model 
alongside the corresponding correlations between observed occurrence rates and 
entropy. The pre occurrence rate correlation with entropy (r = .52) was lower than 
the post-exposure correlation (r = .67). However, in both pre and post-exposure the 
correlation with Hahn and Warren (HW) was higher (pre r = .82, post r = .92). We 
compared the post-exposure correlations using Lee & Preacher’s (2013) method. 
The HW post-experience correlation was significantly greater than the entropy post-
experience correlation (z = 3.30, p < .01). The experiential model clearly provides a 
better fit.  
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Discussion 
A very limited amount of experience (exposure to 200 outcomes) materially 
changed perception of random sequences. Both the sequences generated and those 
judged to be most random were significantly different from those obtained pre-
exposure. Furthermore, participants’ generation and judgment tendencies typically 
taken as indicative of the GF were significantly reduced post-exposure. This is 
notable, first of all, because all participants did was passively observe 200 flips of a 
coin; there have been some demonstrations of learning with respect to randomness 
perception, but these have all involved response specific feedback (e.g., Edwards, 
1961; Neuringer, 1986; Rapoport & Budescu, 1992), not mere observation of a very 
limited sequence of outputs. Moreover, a subtle change in the way the experience 
was delivered was consequential. Differences in learning rates across the sequence 
chunking conditions indicate that it is necessary to take the actual nature of 
experience into account in understanding human randomness perception, as 
assumed by the account. 
For the conditions in which people experienced chunks of length 10 or 100, 
both sequence generation and sequence judgment-based metrics became more 
closely aligned with the normative properties of binomial sequences, while there 
was no significant change for sequences of length five. This was the case even 
though all participants saw exactly the same series of coin tosses overall. This lends 
support to the notion that memory capacity and, or, attention gives rise to a sliding 
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window moving through a global, temporally unfolding sequence experience and 
that this plays a causal role in people’s perceptions of randomness.  
Why then was there no change in the 40 x 5 condition? The fact that there was 
change in the 20 x 10 condition indicates clearly that the lack of change cannot 
simply be based on the fact that the test generation conditions (produce 2 x 100) fail 
to match the training environment (40 x 5). This is further confirmed by the parallel 
results across generation and judgment, because the judgment task involves 
sequences of yet another length (not experienced in training in any of the 
conditions). This suggests as an explanation that the lack of change in the 40 x 5 
condition stems from the fact that this condition might be close to their day-to-day 
experience of binomial sequences such as coin flips. As a consequence, participants 
in this condition effectively experience little that is ‘new’.  
Finally, not only was GF-like behaviour readily modified by participants’ 
limited exposure to a random sequence, but the questionnaire data revealed that 
most participants did not explicitly endorse the gambler’s fallacy. Whilst a large 
majority stated they would bet on tails following a run of heads, the majority of 
those also report that there is no difference in likelihood between heads and tails. 
The fact that people further admit to finding this counter-intuitive can be explained 
as a contrast between what they know to be a declarative fact, and knowledge they 
have gained from experience. This sits well with notion that seeming biases in 
randomness perception such as the GF reflect perceived environmental statistics, 
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and makes clear that the inferential leap from seeming ‘bias’ on implicit measures to 
supposedly mistaken conceptions of randomness are deeply problematic. Our data 
suggest that the alternation rates of generated sequences do not allow us to 
distinguish between people who do and do not explicitly believe in the GF.  This, in 
turn, suggests that claims of human ‘irrationality’ in this context may have been 
considerably overstated. It also suggests that very specific explanations will be 
required to understand the minority who do explicitly endorse the fallacy (a group 
likely to include problem gamblers, see Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, 
Dragonetti & Tsanos, 1997; Ladouceur et al., 2001; Toneatto & Ladouceur, 2003; 
Källmén, H., Andersson, P., & Andren, A., 2008).  
Taken together, our results also pose problems for other accounts of the GF in 
the literature. Possibly the most well-known of these is Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1972) explanation in terms of the so-called ‘representativeness heuristic’. It 
assumes that people fail to appreciate how much the properties of short sequences 
differ from the statistical properties of very long sequences of outputs from a 
random source. 
As a result, they wrongly attribute long-run properties (as captured by the 
Law of Large Numbers), such as likely equal numbers of heads and tails, to short 
sequences and perceive as ‘random’ those sequences that seem most 
‘representative’. Though the representativeness heuristic has been criticized as 
vague in other judgment contexts (see e.g., Gigerenzer, 2009) it has been formalized 
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in the context of randomness perception (e.g., Rabin, 2002; Rapoport & Budescu, 
1997). Somewhat ironically, Hahn and Warren’s (2009) experiential account and the 
present data suggest that the differences between properties of short sequences and 
the long run are indeed key to understanding human perceptions of randomness, 
but not because people’s beliefs about shorter sequences are mistaken, but rather 
because the properties of shorter sequences determine people’s actual experience. 
It is compatible with this latter perspective that participants’ sequence judgment 
and generation was modified by experience, and modified only by presentation in 
the form of longer global sequences. Under the representativeness heuristic one 
would expect the long global sequences to be most similar to the participants’ 
expectations of random sequences. However it was experience with the long global 
sequences that produced the biggest change in behaviour. 
Relatedly, the present data also rule out accounts of over-alternation based on 
the idea that these are generated by short-term limitations constraining sequence 
generation (e.g., Baddeley, 1966; Kareev, 1992)5. Precisely because the alternation 
rate of short sequences lies above the long run average, over-alternations would be 
expected from an unbiased agent who was limited by short-term memory to 
effectively generate a long sequence of ‘random outputs’ by stringing together 
shorter sequences that can be held in working memory (for one way of modelling 
such a process see Rapoport & Budescu, 1997). The fact that participants in the 2 x 
                                                        
5 The same is true of other performance limitation based accounts such as, for example, Treisman 
and Faulkner, 1987. 
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100 experience condition subsequently dropped their alternation rate to the long 
run average of .5 suggests that it is not a performance limitation that is responsible 
for over-alternations in generation tasks. And it is only the experiential account that 
explains the fact that exactly the same thing happens in those participants’ 
judgments of random sequences. 
An alternative approach to understanding human randomness perception 
stems from theoretical accounts of randomness based on compression and 
algorithmic complexity (see e.g. Beltrami, 1999 for an introduction). These seek to 
characterise randomness not in terms of the sequence generating source, but in 
terms of the resultant sequences themselves. Specifically, sequences are random to 
the extent that they are incompressible, that is, they cannot be given shorter 
descriptions than enumerating the sequence itself by exploiting sequence structure. 
Falk and Konold (1997) suggest that people judge a sequence to be less random the 
more ‘regular’ and hence easier it is to encode either in verbal description or 
memory. In other words, memorability of sequences provides a proxy for 
randomness. This means that long streaks or runs, like other regularities, are 
viewed as indicative of non-randomness, which in turn provides an (indirect) 
explanation of over-alternations. While our participants’ initial judgment data 
matches Falk and Konold’s (1997) data for those same sequences, the post-
experience shift is left entirely unexplained. 
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Finally, the present data also caution against the view that over-alternations 
arise because people erroneously believe random processes to be ‘self-correcting’ so 
as to sustain (accurately perceived) global properties of long-run random 
sequences, such as equal numbers of heads and tails. One source for such a 
misconception would be a failure to distinguish between sequences generated with 
and without replacement (e.g., Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991; Ayton et al., 1989; 
Rabin, 2002). In their explicit judgments, the majority of our participants were 
aware of the fact that ‘heads’ or ‘tails’ were equally likely on the next trial. Again, 
over-alternations by those participants, at least, require some other explanation. 
In summary, the present data seem difficult to explain on other accounts of the 
GF and over-alternations, though some of them (in particular an erroneous belief in 
self-correction in random processes) may well play a role in the minority who did 
endorse the GF, in the same way that they may play a role in understanding the 
behaviour of problem gamblers (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 2001). Even in this case, 
however, we maintain that a full appreciation of randomness perception will 
require further study of the links between actual experience and conceptual 
knowledge of the abstract properties of random processes. 
We contend also that such links (and the possible tensions between implicit 
and explicit measures that it can give rise to) will be important for other human 
cognitive ‘biases’. Rather than interpret such behaviours as fallacies, we suggest that 
a deeper insight into human cognition can be obtained through the assumption that 
37 
 
 
cognition is rational under constraints, and that people are seeking to make sensible 
inferences from their experience (Hahn, 2014; Howes, Lewis, and Vera 2009; 
Howes, Warren, Farmer, El-Deredy, Lewis 2016; Lewis, Howes & Singh 2014). The 
present example of (mis)perceiving randomness in the form of the GF suggests 
perhaps that there is limited insight to be gained from cold, hard evaluation of 
human rationality (or lack thereof) against unattainable performance goals. Instead 
the project of trying to understand human behaviour will likely benefit greatly from 
trying to establish causal links between cognitive constraints and behaviour. 
Conclusion 
To address the question posed in the title: explicit belief in the GF may be far 
less widespread than typically assumed. Simple behavioural measures such as 
alternation rates are not sufficient to establish ‘bias’, and what ‘bias’ they show 
seems to be based on people’s actual, limited, experience of random outputs. Rather 
than interpreting behaviours like the GF as biased or irrational, it may be more 
productive to explore what they reveal about the constraints that limit otherwise 
adaptive processes.  
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Figure 1: A. Expected wait time for sub-sequences of length 4 and B. the associated 
probability of not encountering each sequence in a longer ‘global’ sequence of length 
20. The wait time statistic directly determines the non-occurrence probability - the 
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longer the wait time, the higher the probability of non-occurrence in a longer, finite 
string. Reproduced from Hahn & Warren (2009) p.456. 
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Figure 2. The sliding window account from Hahn & Warren (2009) p.455. People’s 
experience of random sequences is theorized to be a local, sliding window through a 
global finite sequence  
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Figure 3: a-f) The number of occurrences of a local sub-sequence within a global 
sequence of length n = 20 (panels a and b), n = 50 (panels c and d) and n = 200 
(panels e and f) for sub-sequences HHHH and HHHT. H = heads; T = tails. Vertical 
dashed lines indicate the mean number of occurrences. Panel g) Skew of the 
sampling distributions of HHHH and HHHT for global sequence lengths n = 20 to n = 
1200.  Panel g from Hahn (2014) p.234. 
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Figure 4. Results of simulations to examine the relative probability that the local 
substrings of red (R) and blue (B) balls will not be contained within a global 
sequence of length 20 for the case of sampling with replacement (leftmost bars) and 
sampling without replacement from urns with decreasing initial numbers of red and 
blue balls (urn size of initially 2000, 200, 50, 30, and 20, respectively).  Figure from 
Hahn (2014) p. 232. 
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Figure 5: Maximum number of sub-sequences HHHH that could be encountered 
when the same length-200 sequence is chunked into different sizes. Points show 
40x5, 20x10, 2x100 and 1x200. 
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Figure 6: a) Alternation rate pre and post-exposure for each of the chunking 
conditions. The largest reduction in alternation rate was in the 2 x 100 group and 
the smallest in the 40 x 5 group. b) Ratio of runs of length 4 to runs of length 3 plus 
an alternation for sequences produced in each condition (This includes 
HHHH:HHHT and TTTT:TTTH). The 2 x 100 condition saw the largest increase in 
ratio, while the 40x5 condition saw the smallest increase. c) Alternation rate judged 
most likely to be produced by a fair coin in each condition. In all panels the 
horizontal dashed line shows the theoretical value for a fair coin. Error bars 
represent ± 1 standard error. 
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Figure 7: Left panel: Change in the ratio of runs of length three to runs of length two 
plus an alternation for sequences produced in each condition (This includes 
HHH:HHT and TTT:TTH). Right Panel: The same analysis for runs of length five and 
runs of length 4 plus an alternation. In both panels the 2 x 100 condition shows the 
largest increase in ratio, while the 40x5 conditions shows the smallest increase. The 
horizontal dashed line shows the theoretical value for a fair coin. Error bars 
represent ± 1 standard error. 
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Figure 8: The maximum number of times a run of heads (or tails) can occur given 
different discretization of a 200 long sequence. The longer the run length the fewer 
occurrences are expected. Data points represent discretization at chunk sizes 5, 10, 
100 and 200. Note the x axis is log scale. 
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Figure 9: A quadratic function fitted to pre and post judgments at the group level. 
The peak of the post-exposure judgments has shifted toward the theoretical value of 
0.5. The vertical lines show the peak of the fit. The grey dashed line shows the 
original data collected by Falk & Konold (1997) p.314, a close match to our pre-
exposure data. Solid grey line shows 2nd-order approximate entropy (Beltrami, 
1999) of the alternation rate. 
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Figure 10: Top panels: Analysis of the implicit measures of the Gambler’s Fallacy 
(alternation rate and ratio HHHH:HHHT) in participants who explicitly either 
believed in the fallacy or not. No difference was found on the implicit measures 
between believers (n = 27) and non-believers (n = 91). These analyses were 
conducted on participants’ pre-exposure generated data. Bottom panel: Distribution 
of change in alternation rate from pre to post exposure for the non-believers. The 
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believers are superimposed as data points. The shaded area represents the central 
95% of the distribution. 
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Fig. 11. The alternation rate of participants’ generated sequences. Each participant’s 
pair of 200-long generated sequences were split into 10 sequences of length 20. 
These were aggregated within each condition to produce the above histograms. The 
vertical dashed lines indicate the mean of the distribution. In the 2x100 and 20x10 
conditions, the mean moves closer to the theoretical value of 0.5 post-exposure. 
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Figure 12. In the left panel, the solid black line shows the entropy based on the 
alternation rate of each possible sub-sequence of length 4. The dashed blue line 
shows the occurrence probability under the sliding window account (Hahn & 
Warren 2009).  The right panel shows the relationship between the two measures. 
The occurrence probability values have jitter added since the symmetry (see left 
panel) means the points actually overlap perfectly. 
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Figure 13. Each data point is 1 of 16 possible sub-sequences of length 4. The rate 
with which participants generate each of these sequences is poorly predicted by 
entropy, but well predicted by the Hahn & Warren (2009) account. The post-
exposure generated occurrence rate fit with Hahn & Warren is r = .92 versus 0.67 
for Entropy. 
 
